The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
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Facts:
On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain grocery items and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by Sapiera. When presented for payment the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Consequently, four charges of estafa were filed against petitioner with the RTC of Dagupan City. After trial, the court a quo acquitted petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. In a petition for mandamus filed by private respondent, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding petitioner liable for the value of the checks.
Issue:
Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against her
Held:
Yes. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
Yes. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of the Civil Code, to wit:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party x x x x It is just and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Sapiera vs. CA, G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999)
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