Justado vs. People
G.R. No. 219567, February 1, 2017

Facts:

Belen filed a complaint, dated March 29, 2010, for grave threats against her brother Justado alleging that on February 2, 2010, she intervened between the quarrel of her siblings Rosa and Justado when the latter pointed a gun at her forehead while uttering "Dito, dito kita babarilin". The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) found probable cause for other light threats instead of grave threats and on September 22, 2010, filed an Information before the MeTC. The MeTC convicted Justado of Other Light Threats. 

On appeal to the SC, Justado claimed that the offense had already prescribed on the basis of Section 11 of the Rules on Summary Procedure and Section 20 of the DOJ Manual. He argued that the Information should have been filed before the court within two months from February 22, 2010, or the date the incident occurred, the crime of Other Light Threats being a light offense with a prescriptive period of 2 months. The Information, however, was only filed on September 22, 2010 or 7 months from the date of the incident. He asserted that the prescription for the offense was not tolled with the filing of the complaint with the OCP on March 29, 2010. 

Issue: 

Did the filing of the complaint before the OCP stop the running of the prescriptive period of the offense charged?

Held: 

The filing of the complaint before the OCP stalled the running of the prescriptive period of the offense. Article 91 of the RPC is clear and categorical that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The Rules on Summary Procedure cannot supplant what is provided under the RPC regarding the prescription of offenses. In Reodica vs. CA (354 Phil 90, [1998]) the Court explained that the RPC did not distinguish whether the complaint or information was filed for preliminary investigation or for an action on the merits. Further, the Court in Reodica stressed that the Rules on Summary Procedure could not prevail over the rules on prescription set forth in RPC, to wit: 

We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

The case of Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Judge Lidua (719 Phil 1, [2013]) cited by Justado as basis that in cases governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, only the filing of an information before the courts can stop the running of the prescriptive period, does not apply because the offense involved therein was a violation of an ordinance, whereas the crime charged against Justado deals with a felony punishable by the RPC.