Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. 

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission (Rule 110, Rules of Court)


General Rule: 

It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.


Exeception: 

If the date of the commission of the offense constitutes an essential element of the offense. 


Crimes where the time of  the commission of  the offense is essential

1. Infanticide (Art. 255, Revised Penal Code)

2. Abortion (Art. 256-257, Revised Penal Code)

3. Violation of election laws

4. Bigamy -  An information for bigamy must state the time and place of the second wedding (People vs. Bustamante, G.R. No. L-11598, January 27, 1959)


People v. Delfin

Fact: The Information alleged that the accused committed the crime of murder on or about November 27, 2000. However, during trial, it was established that the crime was committed on September 27, 2000. The accused contended that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

Held: In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated.

Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information (People v. Delfin, G.R. No. 201572, July 09, 2014).


US v. Smith

Facts: The complaint alleged that the offense was committed in the month of December 1902. According to the proof, it was actually committed in the month of January 1903. The complaint was filed the 9th day of March, 1903. It is argued by the attorney for the defendant that for this reason the accused should have been dismissed upon the theory that the evidence in criminal cases must correspond to the allegations in the complaint.

Held: The complaint was sufficient to sustain conviction even if the proof showed that it was committed in January 1903. It is true that the complaint must allege a specific time and place when and where the offense was committed. The proof, however, need not correspond to this allegation, unless the time and place is material and of the essence of the offense as a necessary ingredient in its description. The evidence is admissible and sufficient if it shows that the crime was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before or after the time stated in the complaint or indictment and before the action is commenced (US v. Smith, G.R. No. L-1360, December 4, 1903).


People v. ZZZ

Facts: Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the date of the commission of the rape. In particular, accused-appellant points to the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-1637 which specified the date of the rape charged as "sometime in the early part of 2008". Accused-appellant counters that this "irregular designation" violates Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Held: [A]n Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime charged. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision.

Further, it cannot be considered that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As cited in People v. Ibañez, the Supreme Court previously upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely alleged that a rape has been committed "sometime in the month of April 1993," for a rape which was committed in 1993; "on or about May 1998," for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998; and "sometime in the month of September 1998" for a rape committed on an evening in September 1998. Here, the allegation in the Information that appellant committed rape "sometime in the early part of 2008" was sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of rape committed against his granddaughter.

It bears emphasis that objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If appellant found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. As appellant failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information. (People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 232329. April 28, 2021)


When the variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal

Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. Such was this Court ruling in the case of People v. Opemia.

In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952 was filed against four (4) accused. After all of the accused entered a plea of not guilty and during trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the effect that the purported theft was committed in July of 1947. The prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of the information to make it conform to the evidence with respect to the date of theft. The trial court rejected the motion and instead dismissed the information altogether. The dispute reaching us in due course, we sustained the trial court's dismissal of the information:

The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the commission of the crime charged from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947. In not permitting the amendment the learned trial Judge said:

It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise time at which an offense was committed need not be alleged in the complaint or information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint would permit. The reason for this rule is obvious. It is to apprise the accused of the approximate date when the offense charged was committed in order to enable him to prepare his defense and thus avoid a surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the accused, who came to court prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not charged.

It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendant has entered his plea, the information or complaint may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant. An amendment that would change the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the difference is not only in the year, but also in the month and in the last two digits of the year. It is apparent that the proposed amendment concerns with material facts constituting the offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Defendants.

His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the amendment as referring to substance and not merely to form. But even supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendants had pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be proper only if it would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the court did not make good use of that discretion in disallowing the amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced thereby would appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court, it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. (People v. Delfin, G.R. No. 201572, July 09, 2014)