Tating v. Marcella
G.R. No. 155208, March 27, 2007

Facts: 

In 1969, Daniela sold her property to her granddaughter, petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena).  Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.

In 1988, Daniela died, leaving her children as her heirs. Her children discovered a sworn statement executed by Danila in 1977 stating that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property. Consequently, they demanded from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Thus, they filed a complaint for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in their favor. The RTC ruled  in  favor  of  the  plaintiffs.  CA affirmed  its  decision. Thus, Nena went to the SC, arguing the sworn statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the same was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her.


Issue: 

Whether or not a sworn statement of Daniela is admissible in evidence and may be given probative value.


Held: 

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. 

It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.